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HOW TO DECIDE WHOSE BANK PAYS: THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in
part, prohibits the federal government from taking private property
“for public use, without just compensation.”1  This provision,
known as the Takings Clause, also applies to state governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which
states that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property
without due process of law.”2  The purpose of the Takings Clause is
to ensure that the government does not place a disproportionate
economic burden on a private person.3
In the early years of the United States’ history, courts viewed
takings as “physical acquisitions of property by the government.”4
This physically-oriented view of takings began to change in the early
twentieth century when the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.5 Pennsylvania Coal intro-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (defining rights pertaining to civil legal proce-
dures).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (extending Takings Clause limits to state
laws).
3. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.”); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S 104, 123 (discussing need to create test to determine when public
action creates economically disproportionate burden between public and private
land owner); Arnold v. United States, 137 Fed. Cl. 524, 549-50 (2018) (quoting
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001)) (discussing how purpose of
Takings Clause is to preclude government from unjustly placing public burdens on
private property owners).
4. Courtney Harrington, Comment, Penn Central to Palazzolo: Regulatory Taking
Decisions and Their Implications for the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 383, 385 (2002) (describing changes in application of takings
doctrine).
5. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922) (discussing detrimental
impact of Kohler Act on property rights); see Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Seger-
son, Regulatory Takings, U. CONN. DEP’T OF ECON. WORKING PAPER SERIES, 2-3
(2011), http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/working/2011-16.pdf (discussing
how Pennsylvania Coal introduced concept of regulatory takings by creating dimi-
nution in value test).  Before Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court showed hostil-
ity to the idea of a regulatory taking. See Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S. Ct. 273, 282-83
(1887) (holding claim that liquor law diminished brewery owner’s property value
in violation of the Fifth Amendment would not “be seriously entertained.”).
(137)
1
McCanless: How to Decide Whose Bank Pays: The Impact of Supreme Court Taking
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
138 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30: p. 137
duced the concept of a “regulatory taking,” where the government
is required to compensate a private property owner when a regula-
tion decreases the value of that owner’s property.6  Following Penn-
sylvania Coal, later cases developed greater restrictions on
government actions by expanding the definition of a regulatory tak-
ing.7  In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles,8 the Supreme Court determined a taking may occur
when a regulation temporarily impedes the use of property.9  Addi-
tionally, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,10 the Court
placed greater scrutiny on the relationship between the regulation
at issue and the public interest, which increased the likelihood a
regulatory taking would be found.11
In the 1970s, an increase in strong environmental laws sparked
a disagreement between property rights advocates and environmen-
talists, which ultimately led to the emergence of the property rights
movement.12  Property rights advocates, including the late Justice
Scalia, claim environmental regulations can unduly harm the na-
tional economy and interfere with landowners’ rights to use their
property however they desire.13  In contrast, environmentalists have
seen the property rights movement as a threat to modern environ-
mental laws and responsible for promoting “a corporate ‘right to
pollute’.”14
6. See Miceli & Segerson, supra note 5, at 3-4 (discussing how Pennsylvania Coal
changed Takings Clause doctrine by holding taking could be found if property
value was sufficiently diminished).
7. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24 (describing factors identified in prior
decisions that are used to determine whether regulatory taking occurred).
8. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
9. Id. at 322 (holding takings could be found when temporary regulation was
implemented).
10. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
11. Id. at 841-42 (holding regulation’s connection to public interest was insuf-
ficient to justify California’s failure to compensate affected property owners).
12. See Harrington, supra note 4, at 387-88 (discussing how land rights activists
felt regulations placed unjust burden for promoting environmental protection on
landowners).
13. See Douglas T. Kendall, The Limits to Growth and the Limits to the Takings
Clause, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 547, 548 (1992) (discussing positions of property rights
advocates challenging environmental regulations).
14. See B.J. Bergman, Ronald Reagan’s Revenge: The ‘Takings’ Campaign and How
It Grew Anti-Environment, Anti-Taxpayer, Anti-Democratic, SIERRA CLUB (1994), https:/
/vault.sierraclub.org/planet/199407/takings.asp (discussing President Reagan Ad-
ministration’s weakening of environmental regulations and environmental activ-
ists’ response).
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The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause has
continued to evolve since Pennsylvania Coal.15  This Comment ex-
amines the evolving definition of a regulatory taking under the Tak-
ings Clause and its potential impact on environmental laws by
focusing on Clean Water Act (CWA) dredge and fill permits.16  Sec-
tion II provides a background of the major cases interpreting the
Takings Clause.17  Section III discusses trends reflected in the Su-
preme Court’s changing interpretation of a regulatory taking under
the Takings Clause.18  Section IV assesses the impacts of the Court’s
changing definition of a regulatory taking on CWA dredge and fill
permits to show potential impacts on environmental regulations.19
II. DEVELOPING THE METHOD TO DETERMINE WHOSE BANK IS
USED: SUPREME COURT REGULATORY TAKING CASES
Starting with Pennsylvania Coal in 1922, the Supreme Court has
decided a series of cases that have significantly impacted the defini-
tion of a regulatory taking.20  The first major case after Pennsylvania
Coal was Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,21 which
established the first test to assess whether a regulatory taking has
occurred.22  Following Penn Central, the Court created a second reg-
ulatory takings test in Agins v. Tiburon.23  The Court later invali-
dated the Agins test in Lingle v. Chevron.24
15. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943-47 (2017) (describing how to
determine unit of land to be assessed in a regulatory takings analysis); Daniel A.
Farber, Murr v. Wisconsin and the Future of Takings Law, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 164-
67 (2017) (discussing how Murr shifts takings jurisprudence in favor of environ-
mental regulations).
16. For a discussion of general trends in regulatory takings law, see infra notes
202-264 and accompanying text.
17. For a summary of major Supreme Court cases interpeting the Takings
Clause, see infra notes 20-197 and accompanying text.
18. For a description of Supreme Court Takings Clause case trends, see infra
notes 198-232 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the Supreme Court takings cases’ impact on dredge
and fill permits, see infra notes 233-264 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 38-197 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania Coal
and cases following it).
21. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. See infra notes 53-75 and accompanying text (discussing Penn Central and
its influence on Supreme Court takings jurisprudence).
23. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (announcing decision on claims that particular zon-
ing ordinances constituted regulatory takings).
24. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing Agins’ and Lingle’s
impacts on regulatory takings).
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The 1980s saw a series of three cases that reaffirmed Penn-
sylvania Coal and expanded the definition of a regulatory taking.25
The first case, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,26 reaf-
firmed Pennsylvania Coal’s diminution in value test.27  Later in Nol-
lan, the Supreme Court placed greater limits on a government’s
ability to use its police powers to implement environmental regula-
tions.28  In First English, the Court held an interim regulation could
be considered a temporary taking.29  In 2002, the Court declined to
create a per se takings category for a temporary taking in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.30
After the 1980s, the Court continued to refine the regulatory
taking analysis.31  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,32 the
Court created a per se takings category for a regulation that de-
prives a private property owner’s land of all value.33  After Lucas,
the Court held in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 34 that a regulatory taking
can be found even if the regulation exists before the private prop-
erty owner buys the land.35  The last major regulatory taking case,
Murr v. Wisconsin,36 resolved the question of what portion of the
property at issue should be assessed when determining the prop-
erty’s lost economic value.37
25. See infra notes 97-126 and accompanying text (discussing Keystone, Nollan,
and First English’s holdings and impacts on definition of regulatory taking).
26. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
27. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing Keystone and its
influence on regulatory takings).
28. See infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text (explaining Nollan and its
move towards favoring private property rights).
29. See infra notes 116-126 and accompanying text (discussing First English and
its creation of temporary takings).
30. See 535 U.S. 302, 341-42 (2002) (holding First English should not be ex-
tended to create per se takings category for temporary takings).
31. See infra notes 144-197 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, and Murr v. Wisconsin and their
impacts on regulatory takings doctrine).
32. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
33. See infra notes 144-159 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas and its
creation of current basic structure used in takings cases).
34. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
35. See infra notes 160-174 and accompanying text (explaining Palazzolo and
its impact on regulatory takings jurisprudence).
36. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
37. See infra notes 175-197 and accompanying text (discussing Murr and its
creation of denominator test).
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A. Declaring Potential for the Government’s Bank to Be Used
Instead of Private Property Owner’s: Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon
Leading to Pennsylvania Coal, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed the Kohler Act, which prohibited coal mining that caused
subsidence of “any structure used as a human habitation.”38  Before
the passage of the Kohler Act, the Pennsylvania Coal Company
(Pennsylvania Coal) conveyed surface rights to the plaintiff in a
deed, but retained subsurface rights to mine the coal beneath the
surface.39  When Pennsylvania Coal attempted to mine the coal, the
plaintiffs brought suit, claiming the Kohler Act precluded Penn-
sylvania Coal from mining the coal.40  Pennsylvania Coal defended
its right to mine by challenging the Kohler Act, arguing the law
violated the Takings Clause because it destroyed Pennsylvania
Coal’s contractual right to mine on its property.41
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pennsylvania Coal and
held the Kohler Act was invalid because it constituted a taking of
subsurface coal mining rights.42  The Court stated the government
may regulate property “to a certain extent,” but if the “regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”43  Additionally, the
Court stated that if a regulation has diminished the economic po-
tential of the affected private property to “a certain magnitude,” the
government is understood to have exercised eminent domain and
must reimburse the private property owner.44  The Court noted this
inquiry, known as the diminution in value test, should be fact spe-
cific, and courts should afford great deference to the legislature’s
judgment.45
When the Court applied the diminution in value test in Penn-
sylvania Coal, it determined that all economic value in Pennsylvania
Coal’s subsurface coal rights had been extinguished by the Kohler
38. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922) (describing bounda-
ries of Kohler Act).
39. Id. at 412 (describing deed executed by Pennsylvania Coal Company).
40. Id. (discussing contract Pennsylvania Coal Co. made to mine coal).
41. See id. at 412-13 (describing suit brought against coal company for violat-
ing Kohler Act and coal company appealing unfavorable state court decision).
42. See id. at 415-16 (finding Kohler Act’s application to Pennsylvania Coal
constituted a taking and discussing generally how regulations could be considered
takings).
43. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415 (explaining why regulation could be consid-
ered taking).
44. Id. at 413 (placing limitations on state’s police power).
45. Id. (discussing factors to consider when determining diminution of
property).
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Act.46  Specifically, the Kohler Act’s restrictions made it economi-
cally impractical for Pennsylvania Coal to extract the coal.47  The
Court noted the only value in subsurface rights to coal was the abil-
ity to mine the coal for a profit.48  Consequently, Pennsylvania
Coal’s inability to mine the coal for a profit had almost “the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying
it.”49
While the Supreme Court created the diminution in value test,
it also created ambiguity in the regulatory takings analysis.50  By sug-
gesting that the takings analysis was fact specific, the Court ne-
glected to create a more precise test to determine when a
regulation would diminish the economic potential of a property
enough to justify a takings claim.51  This left courts guessing as to
what factors to consider when determining whether a regulation
had diminished the value of the property enough to constitute a
regulatory taking.52
B. First Method for Determining Whose Bank is Used: Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
The next major Supreme Court case to address regulatory tak-
ings was decided more than five decades later in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City of New York.53  In Penn Central, New York City
passed the Landmarks Preservation Law to protect historic
landmarks from being destroyed or having a landmark’s character
fundamentally altered.54  Pursuant to this purpose, the Landmarks
Preservation Commission (Commission) labeled designated his-
toric buildings as a “landmark” on a “landmark site.”55  After the
46. Id. at 414-15 (concluding Kohler Act effectively eliminated Pennsylvania
Coal’s right to mine coal).
47. Id. at 414 (discussing what makes ownership of coal valuable).
48. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414 (explaining why Kohler Act extinguished
value of Pennsylvania Coal’s mining rights).
49. Id. (explaining how economic use of plaintiff’s property was diminished).
50. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity left in
regulatory takings analysis after Pennsylvania Coal).
51. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413 (discussing how different facts can be consid-
ered to determine whether there was regulatory taking).
52. See id. (discussing how decrease in property value can become significant
enough to become taking).
53. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978)
(discussing factors to consider in regulatory taking analysis).
54. Id. at 108-09 (describing need to use Landmarks Act to protect historical
sites).
55. Id. at 110-11 (describing how Landmarks Act is applied to protect histori-
cal structures).
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Commission designated a site as a landmark, the Board of Estimate
could change or reject the designation.56  The property owner
could then “seek judicial review of the final designation decision.”57
Once the owner had a building designated as a landmark, the
owner was required to obtain approval from the Commission
before the owner could make any changes to the outside of the
building.58  Owners who were unable to change a landmark could
transfer their development rights to proximate lots.59
Under the Landmarks Preservation Law, the Commission, after
holding a public hearing, designated Grand Central Terminal as a
“landmark” on a “landmark site.”60  The owner, Penn Central
Transportation Company (Penn Central), subsequently leased the
landmark site to another company that wanted to build an office
tower on top of the Terminal, but the Commission rejected Penn
Central’s plans.61  Penn Central then sued the City of New York and
claimed the Landmarks Preservation Law violated Penn Central’s
Fifth Amendment right to compensation for a taking of its
property.62
To assess whether a regulatory taking had occurred, the Su-
preme Court identified three factors necessary for a regulatory tak-
ings analysis.63  The factors included 1) the “economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant”; 2) the interference with “invest-
ment-backed expectations”; and 3) the nature of the government’s
action, ranging from outright “physical invasion” to protection of
“the common good.”64
56. Id. at 111 (describing process for designating landmark).
57. Id. (discussing property owner’s options for protesting landmark ruling).
58. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 112 (describing restrictions on property owner’s
land use after designation as landmark).
59. Id. at 114-15 (discussing alternatives that Landmarks Act provided for
owners of landmark sites).
60. Id. at 115-16 (discussing how Grand Central became designated “land-
mark” under Landmarks Preservation Law).
61. Id. at 116 (describing Penn Central’s attempt to lease area above Grand
Central for construction and Commission’s rejection of its construction plans).
62. Id. at 118-19 (describing Penn Central’s claim against New York City for
denying planned office building).  Penn Central also brought a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process claim, but discussion of this claim is beyond the scope of
this Comment. Id. at 118-19, 120-22 (discussing Penn Central’s due process claim
and why it was denied).
63. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24 (describing previous court decisions to
consider when assessing whether there was regulatory taking).
64. Id. (describing factors to be considered when determining whether regu-
latory taking occurred).
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The Court ultimately held Penn Central failed to show there
was a taking.65  When assessing the economic impact, the Court
found that diminution in value alone was inadequate to find a tak-
ing.66  The Court noted historical landmark designations were used
nationwide, and invalidating New York City’s landmark designa-
tions would invalidate “all comparable landmark legislation” in the
United States.67  Penn Central also failed to prove the Commis-
sion’s landmark designation interfered with investment-backed ex-
pectations.68  The Court noted Penn Central Station was always
used as a railroad terminal, and Penn Central intended to keep us-
ing it as a railroad terminal.69  Lastly, the both parties agreed the
government had a valid public interest in “preserving structures
and areas with special historic, architectural, or cultural
significance.”70
While the Court provided greater guidance on how to assess a
regulatory takings claim, the Court failed to remedy the ambiguity
of the regulatory takings analysis.71  Specifically, the Court ne-
glected to provide guidance on how to balance each factor and
what standards to use to determine when a factor would weigh in
favor of a taking.72  The lack of guidance on assessing the economic
impact of a regulation has led to the use of various tests, such as the
“with and without approach” and “regulated-value-minus-invest-
ment” test.73  Moreover, the ambiguous nature of Penn Central’s gov-
ernment action factor has generated concern because of its
65. Id. at 138 (concluding Penn Central failed to show there was taking).
66. See id. at 131 (explaining prior decisions have rejected notion that diminu-
tion of all property value is sufficient to demonstrate regulatory taking).
67. Id. (explaining Penn Central’s argument should be rejected because it
would go against traditional landmark laws used in United States).
68. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-38 (applying one factor of takings analysis to
determine whether government had taken Penn Central’s property).
69. Id. at 136 (distinguishing Penn Central from other takings cases to demon-
strate New York City’s landmark designations law “does not interfere in any way
with the present uses of the [railroad terminal].”).
70. Id. at 129 (discussing facts not in dispute in Penn Central).
71. See id. (discussing various fact-based arguments offered by Penn Central
Transportation Company); Steven J. Eagle, “Economic Impact” in Regulatory Takings
Law, 19 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 407, 409-10 (2013) (discussing diffi-
culties with ambiguity created by Penn Central); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoher-
ence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 528-29 (2009) (discussing
problems with analyzing Penn Central’s “character” factor).
72. See Eagle, supra note 71, at 409-10 (discussing how Court did not provide
more guidance on how to apply Penn Central test).
73. See id., at 417-23 (explaining general methods used to calculate economic
impact of regulation on property value).
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potential construction as a substantive due process test.74  If used as
a substantive due process test, the nature of the government action
factor could appear to favor the private property owner or the
government.75
C. Second Method for Determining Whose Bank is Used: Agins
v. Tiburon and Lingle v. Chevron
The next major regulatory takings case was Agins v. Tiburon.76
In Agins, the city of Tiburon, California passed zoning ordinances
with density restrictions that, in effect, allowed the appellants to
build only one to five single-family residences on their land.77
Without attempting to obtain approval to develop the land, the ap-
pellants claimed the ordinances were facially unconstitutional
under the Takings Clause.78  The appellants asserted their property
in Tiburon was highly valuable due to the “magnificent views of San
Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas.”79  They claimed
the government’s rezoning of the property “forever prevented [its]
development for residential use” which “completely destroyed the
value of [appellants’] property for any purpose or use whatso-
ever.”80  The Supreme Court disagreed and held zoning ordinances
on their face do not take property without just compensation.81  In
its evaluation of the zoning ordinances, the Court created a new
two-pronged test to determine whether a regulatory taking had oc-
curred.82  The test evaluated 1) whether the regulation “substan-
74. See Fenster, supra note 71, at 528-29 (discussing how Penn Central test
might be used as substantive due process analysis).
75. See id. (explaining how character factor in Penn Central could favor govern-
ment or private property owner).
76. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 259 (1980) (describing suit claiming zon-
ing ordinance was regulatory taking).
77. Id. at 257 (describing creation of zoning ordinance to regulate land
development).
78. Id. at 257-58 (describing plaintiffs’ failure to follow typical judicial proce-
dure and claim under Takings Clause).
79. Id. at 258 (citing Brief of Appellants at 3-4, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980) (No. 79-602)) (describing plaintiffs’ claim that their property had been
deprived of all value).
80. Id. (citing Brief of Appellants at 5, 7, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980) (No. 79-602)) (describing plaintiff’s argument that rezoning diminished all
of plaintiffs’ property value).
81. Agins, 447 U.S. at 259 (holding zoning ordinance did not constitute a
facially unconstitutional regulatory taking).
82. Id. at 260 (describing procedure to assess whether regulatory taking
occurred).
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tially advance[s] legitimate state interests”; and 2) whether the
“regulation denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”83
This new test announced in Agins further complicated the reg-
ulatory takings analysis by creating a second standard for courts to
use when assessing a takings claim.84  Significantly, the Court ne-
glected to clarify when courts should use the Agins test rather than
the Penn Central test.85  This led to other courts having to guess
whether to apply the Agins test or the Penn Central test.86  The Agins
test also complicated the analysis by incorporating substantive due
process principles, whereby courts would conduct a review of the
law’s purpose and the connection between that purpose and the
law’s function.87  By treating the takings analysis like a substantive
due process test, the Agins test placed greater scrutiny on the gov-
ernment’s action and increased the likelihood a taking would be
found.88
In 2005, Lingle v. Chevron solved these problems when the Su-
preme Court determined the Agins test should not be used to evalu-
ate whether a regulatory taking has occurred.89  In Lingle, Hawaii
passed a statute that limited the rent oil companies could charge
the dealers who leased service stations from those companies.90  Ap-
plying the Agins test, lower courts held the statute was invalid be-
83. Id. (discussing factors to assess when determining whether regulatory tak-
ing occurred).
84. See infra notes 85-88 (discussing complications caused by Agins, which in-
cluded failing to specify when to use the Agins test and conflating takings with
substantive due process).
85. See Agins 447 U.S. at 260-61 (describing rationale to apply to takings
analysis).
86. See Darren Botello-Samson, Comment, You Say Takings, and I Say Takings:
The History and Potential of Regulatory Taking Challenges to the Endangered Species Act,
16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 293, 312-13 (2006) (discussing problems created by
holding in Agins).  Courts generally favored using the Penn Central test over the
Agins test. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting
“[t]he Penn Central factors . . . have served as the principal guidelines for resolving
regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas
rules.”); see, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611, 616 (2001) (applying
Penn Central test to determine whether government agency’s denial of waterfront
property owner’s plans to develop his land violated Takings Clause); Ruckelhaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990, 1005 (1984) (applying Penn Central principles to
determine whether provision in Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act requiring companies to disclose certain data constituted regulatory taking).
87. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540-42 (explaining how Agins test was derived from
due process cases, as opposed to takings cases).
88. See Fenster, supra note 71, at 537-39 (describing Ninth Circuit cases using
Agins and how Agins favored plaintiffs in those cases).
89. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532 (concluding Agins test should not be applied
when court conducts regulatory takings analysis).
90. Id. (discussing lower courts’ use of Agins to assess Hawaii rent cap statute).
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cause the statute did not “substantially advance” the state’s interests
“in controlling retail gasoline prices.”91  Consequently, both the dis-
trict court and the circuit court determined that Hawaii conducted
an uncompensated taking that violated the Takings Clause.92
In Lingle, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the
Agins test in regulatory takings cases because the “substantially ad-
vances” requirement was a question of substantive due process,
rather than a question of whether a taking was lawful.93  The Court
also determined the Agins test was inappropriate because it could
be interpreted as demanding a “heightened means-ends review of
virtually any regulation of private property.”94  According to the
court, this review would require courts to usurp the role of agencies
and legislatures by examining whether regulations serve their in-
tended purposes.95
D. The 1980s Takings Trilogy
During the 1980s, three major Supreme Court cases helped re-
fine the Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence.96  The first case the
Supreme Court decided during this period was Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis.97  In Keystone, Pennsylvania’s Bituminous
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Subsidence Act) pro-
hibited coal mining that caused subsidence damage to pre-existing
public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries.98  In addition, a Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) regulation
created under the Subsidence Act required fifty-percent of coal
under protected structures to remain in place to provide surface
91. Id. (discussing lower courts’ findings that gasoline rent cap violated Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
92. Id. at 534-36 (describing lower courts’ applications of Agins test).
93. Id. at 540 (explaining Agins is improper test to apply in regulatory takings
cases).
94. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544 (discussing how requirement for public benefit
does not determine whether taking has occurred).
95. See id. at 544 (explaining consequences of applying Agins test to regulatory
takings claims).
96. See infra notes 97-126 and accompanying text (discussing takings cases in
1980s); see also Mark W. Cordes, The Land Use Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Stevens: Two Views on Balancing Public and Private Interests in Property, 34 ENVI-
RONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 12-19, 22-27 (2010) (detailing 1987 cases and differ-
ences of opinion between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens).
97. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 478-79
(1987) (describing underlying facts of complaint alleging parts of Pennsylvania’s
Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act were unconstitutional).
98. Id. at 476 (describing Subsidence Act’s limits on coal mining).
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support.99  Coal companies filed a complaint against officials of the
DER, and alleged Sections 4 and 6 of the Subsidence Act, as applied
through the DER regulation, constituted a taking of private prop-
erty without compensation.100
Applying the Penn Central test, the Supreme Court held no reg-
ulatory taking occurred because the  challenged provisions of the
Subsidence Act did not make the mines unprofitable or undermine
the coal companies’ “investment-backed expectations.”101  The
Court emphasized the connection between the Subsidence Act and
the public interest, and the principle that the greater the reduction
in the entire property value, the more likely a regulatory taking
would be found.102  In articulating this principle, the Court reaf-
firmed Pennsylvania Coal’s diminution in value test and placed
greater emphasis on the public interest than the Court did in Penn-
sylvania Coal.103  As the Court explained, the Takings Clause does
not require the government to compensate a private property
owner who uses his or her property in a manner that harms the
community.104
Another regulatory takings case in the 1980s favoring private
property owners’ rights was Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.105  The California Coastal Commission granted the Nollans a
building permit on the condition that they allow an easement to
pass across their beach.106  The purposes of the easement were 1)
99. Id. at 476-77 (describing DER regulation limiting amount of coal to be
mined).
100. Id. at 478-79 (discussing claim that two sections of Subsidence Act vio-
lated Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).  Section 4 “prohibit[ed] mining that
cause[d] subsidence damage to three categories of structures that were in place on
April 17, 1966: public buildings and noncommercial buildings generally used by
the public; dwellings used for human habitation; and cemeteries.” Id. at 476.  Sec-
tion 6 “authorize[d] the DER to revoke a mining permit if the removal of coal
cause[d] damage to a structure or area protected by § 4 and the operator [did]
not within six months either repair[ ] the damage, satisfy[ ] any claim arising
therefrom, or deposit[ ] a sum equal to the reasonable cost of repair with the DER
as security.” Id. at 477.
101. Id. at 492-93, 499 (concluding coal companies failed to establish chal-
lenged provisions of Subsidence Acts violated Takings Clause).
102. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492, 497 (discussing impacts of purported inter-
est Subsidence Act intends to serve and property value reduction on takings
claim).
103. See id. (discussing significance of public interest and property value in
regulatory taking analysis).
104. See id. at 491-92 (describing how requirements of Takings Clause do not
overcome government’s strong interest in preventing public harm).
105. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (summariz-
ing rationale for ruling in favor of Nollans).
106. Id. at 828 (discussing California Coastal Commission’s condition for Nol-
lans’ permit).
12
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to protect the public’s ability to view the ocean, 2) “[to assist] the
public in overcoming the ‘psychological barrier’ to using the beach
created by a developed shorefront,” and 3) to prevent overcrowd-
ing of beaches.107
The Nollans sued California and argued the easement violated
the Takings Clause.108  They claimed the condition should not have
been attached to the permit because there was insufficient evidence
to show the “proposed development would have a direct adverse
impact on public access to the beach.”109  Using the Agins test, the
Commission claimed “a permit condition that serves the same legiti-
mate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should
not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would
not constitute a taking.”110  The Commission asserted protecting
the public’s view of the beach, helping the public overcome “the
‘psychological barrier’ to using the beach created by a developed
shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches” were
permissible state interests that demonstrated the constitutionality of
the permit condition.111
Despite California’s arguments to the contrary, the Supreme
Court held the permit condition was an illegitimate exercise of Cali-
fornia’s police power.112  As Justice Brennan summarized in his dis-
sent, the majority reasoned the permit neglected to establish a
“reasonable relationship between the effect of the development
and the condition imposed.”113  The Court majority stated Califor-
nia was free to use eminent domain to create a program providing
public beach access, but could not impose the burden of that pro-
107. Id. at 835 (detailing California Coastal Commission’s rationale behind
permit condition).
108. Id. at 828-31 (detailing history of Nollans’ suit claiming permit condition
violated Takings Clause).
109. Id. at 828 (describing Nollans’ argument in their petition to Ventura Su-
perior County Court).
110. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 (summarizing Commission’s argument that per-
mit condition did not violate Takings Clause).
111. Id. at 835 (describing Commission’s assertion that its restriction was justi-
fied by various public policy concerns).
112. See id. at 836-37, 841-42 (discussing California’s justification for its permit
condition and subsequently concluding justification was insufficient).  A police
power “is the fundamental power of the government to secure our rights, the
power to protect members of the community against harm from each other, as
defined by our rights against each other, or against harm from outsiders.”  Ste-
phen J. Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights Movement, Policy Analysis No. 558, CATO
INST., 10 (2005), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa558
.pdf.
113. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing majority’s
conclusion that permit condition could not be justified through California’s police
power).
13
McCanless: How to Decide Whose Bank Pays: The Impact of Supreme Court Taking
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
150 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30: p. 137
gram on coastal residents without providing compensation.114  The
potential effect of this ruling was increased scrutiny on local gov-
ernments’ abilities to regulate land use through their police powers
by requiring a closer relationship between the regulation and the
private property use.115
E. Problems with Temporary Regulatory Takings
Deviating from Keystone, the Court in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles imposed greater
restrictions on the government’s ability to pass environmental regu-
lations affecting property interests without compensating property
owners.116  After a major flood, the County of Los Angeles passed
an interim ordinance prohibiting the construction or reconstruc-
tion of any structure or building in certain flooded areas.117  The
purpose of the interim ordinance was to ensure the “immediate
preservation of the public health and safety.”118  The flood had de-
stroyed First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale’s
(Church) campground, and the moratorium prohibited the
Church from rebuilding.119
The Church filed a complaint, which claimed the interim ordi-
nance constituted a regulatory taking.120  Specifically, the Church
argued the ordinance deprived the campground of all economic
use by precluding the Church from rebuilding the campground,
and the California Supreme Court erred in interpreting Agins as
prohibiting compensation for a temporary taking.121  The defen-
114. Id. at 841-42 (explaining comprehensive plan was not valid reason for
failing to compensate Nollans after imposing regulation on their property).
115. See id. (placing greater limits on states’ abilities to exercise police pow-
ers); David Schultz, Scalia, Property, and Dolan v. Tigard, the Emergence of a Post-
Carolene Products Jurisprudence, 29 AKRON L. REV. 1, 14, 18-19, 29-31 (1995) (discuss-
ing multiple property rights opinions written by Justice Scalia and Justice Scalia’s
support for greater scrutiny of government regulations impacting property rights).
116. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987) (reversing California Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion and ruling in favor of property owner).
117. Id. at 307 (describing reason for imposing moratoria on building).
118. Id. at 307 (stating Los Angeles’ rationale for passing ordinance that was
effective immediately).
119. Id. (describing issues leading to flooding of Lutherglen).
120. See id. at 308 (discussing content of Church’s complaint against Los
Angeles).
121. See First English, 482 U.S. at 308, 310 (describing Church’s claims against
government in state court and argument used in appeal to U.S. Supreme Court).
The Church originally had two claims. Id. at 308.  The first claim asserted “the
defendants were liable under Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 835[ ] for dangerous condi-
tions on their upstream properties that contributed to the flooding of Luther-
glen.” Id.  The second claim requested recovery “from the Flood Control District
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss1/5
2019] HOW TO DECIDE WHOSE BANK PAYS 151
dant countered that the ordinance was only temporary and takings
claims did not cover temporary regulations.122
The Supreme Court ultimately held that, although the interim
ordinance was temporary, the ordinance still constituted a taking
and the government was required to provide compensation.123  The
Court determined that when the regulation temporarily altered use
of the land, it changed the property owner’s interest by reducing it
from “full ownership to one of temporary use and occupation.”124
According to the Court, “ ‘temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from
permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires com-
pensation.”125  Treating the facts of the allegation as true, the Court
held the County of Los Angeles was required to compensate the
Church because the interim ordinance impeded the Church’s abil-
ity to use its campground for “a considerable period of years.”126
Property rights advocates attempted to construe First English to
indicate a temporary regulation limiting land use should be consid-
ered a per se taking.127  The Supreme Court considered this inter-
pretation of First English in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.128  The Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA) placed temporary moratoria on construction in the
Lake Tahoe Basin for thirty-two months.129  The TRPA planned to
create a comprehensive land-use plan during the moratoria’s oper-
ation to ensure development around Lake Tahoe was “environmen-
in inverse condemnation and in tort for engaging in cloud seeding during the
storm that flooded Lutherglen.” Id.  The California Court of Appeal condensed
the claims and interpreted the complaint as alleging the County of Los Angeles
engaged in an uncompensated taking of the Church’s property. Id. at 309.
122. See First English, 482 U.S. at 319-20 (describing prior cases defendant
cited to support its argument that compensation was not required for temporary
regulation).
123. Id. at 322 (stating rationale behind holding that Church’s Fifth Amend-
ment right was violated).
124. Id. at 318 (quoting United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958)) (dis-
cussing previous Supreme Court cases where government temporarily employed its
right to use private property).
125. Id. (analyzing prior case law and concluding temporary takings are
equivalent to permanent takings under Takings Clause).
126. Id. at 322 (explaining rationale for requiring Los Angeles to compensate
Church for meritorious takings claim).
127. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 306, 320 (2002) (discussing landowners’ advocacy for adoption of per se
rule).
128. Id. (describing need to determine whether per se takings had occurred
when temporary regulation was imposed on landowners).
129. Id. at 306 (describing temporary moratoria implemented by TRPA).
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tally sound.”130  Landowners filed suit against the TRPA and
claimed the moratoria constituted uncompensated regulatory tak-
ings that violated the Fifth Amendment by forbidding them from
building on or altering their property.131  TRPA countered, con-
tending the building restrictions were “reasonable temporary plan-
ning moratoria” that should not constitute a per se taking of all
economic value.132
The landowners argued a per se taking occurs anytime a regu-
lation deprives the owner of all economic use, regardless of how
long the regulation would be in place.133  The Court ultimately re-
jected this per se takings approach because the rule would broadly
apply to delays from “obtaining building permits, changes in zoning
ordinances, variances . . . as well as [from] orders temporarily
prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health
codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now
foresee.”134  Moreover, as the Court explained, if a per se rule were
adopted, it would “require changes in numerous practices that have
long been considered permissible exercises of the police power.”135
Instead, the Supreme Court determined the appropriate method of
evaluating temporary takings claims is to apply the Penn Central
test.136
Ultimately, the Court refused to find that a moratorium delay-
ing land use for more than a year violates the Takings Clause.137
Although a moratorium’s duration is not dispositive of a taking, the
Court noted duration is a significant factor that should be consid-
130. Id. (explaining purpose of temporary moratoria was to create land use
plan for area surrounding Lake Tahoe).  Over the years preceding Tahoe-Sierra,
Lake Tahoe experienced significant development that led to nutrient pollution
and Clean Water Act violations. Id. at 307-09.
131. See id. at 306, 312 (describing landowners’ complaint alleging temporary
moratoria violated Takings Clause).
132. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 316 (describing district court’s ruling against
government).
133. See id. at 320-21 (detailing landowners’ argument that per se rule for
temporary takings should be adopted).
134. Id. at 334-35 (concluding proposed per se takings rule “surely [could
not] be sustained.”).
135. Id. at 334-35 (discussing whether new categorical rule would be better
than Penn Central test).
136. See id. at 342 (holding Penn Central test should be applied in temporary
regulatory takings cases).
137. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341-42 (concluding that regulation lasting more
than one year is not necessarily “constitutionally unacceptable.”).  Despite this
holding, the Court noted regulations that are effective for longer than one year
“should be viewed with skepticism.” Id.
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss1/5
2019] HOW TO DECIDE WHOSE BANK PAYS 153
ered in a regulatory takings analysis.138  According to the majority,
to hold otherwise would impede state legislatures’ abilities to create
effective land-use plans due to financial and time constraints.139
The Supreme Court exercised well-reasoned judgment in
Tahoe-Sierra when it held there should not be a per se taking for a
regulation depriving the landowner of certain land uses.140  To find
otherwise could have damaged the government’s ability to make
land use decisions that could improve the environment.141  Using
Tahoe-Sierra as an example, the government needed to conduct a
long-term study to determine how to prevent pollution around
Lake Tahoe and to satisfy Clean Water Act requirements.142  If a
per se rule had been adopted for a temporary taking, the govern-
ment would have been required to choose between paying a signifi-
cant sum of money to compensate the landowners or violating the
Clean Water Act.143
F. When the Private Property Owner’s Land Cannot Put Extra
Money in the Bank: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council
The next major case to alter the Supreme Court’s regulatory
takings jurisprudence was Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.144
In Lucas, the South Carolina legislature passed the Beachfront Man-
agement Act (BMA), which precluded Lucas from building any
“permanent habitable structures” on his two immediately adjacent
138. Id. at 342 (describing important factors to consider in Penn Central test).
The Court found that to consider only the property during the regulation’s effec-
tive period would, in essence, ignore Penn Central’s central tenet that the parcel be
considered as a whole. Id. at 331.
139. See id. at 334-35, 342 (describing potential impacts of per se rule).
140. See id. at 334-35 (describing detrimental impact on government if per se
rule adopted for temporary takings); see Charles V. Dumas III, Comment, Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: The Supreme Court
Reaffirms the Importance of Land-Use Planning and Wisely Refuses to Set Concrete Outer
Limits, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 209, 236-38 (2003) (concluding that Tahoe-Sierra was
correctly decided because bright-line rule for determining temporary taking would
impede governments’ abilities to develop effective land-use planning).
141. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334-35, 342 (describing problems with adopt-
ing per se rule).
142. See id. at 307-12 (describing Lake Tahoe’s pollution problems and need
to create comprehensive plan to address them).
143. See id. at 307-13 (discussing Lake Tahoe’s environmental issues and not-
ing multiple plaintiffs in suit).
144. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-07 (1992) (deciding
whether Beachfront Management Act’s application to Lucas’ property constituted
taking in violation of Takings Clause).
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parcels on a barrier island.145  Lucas sued the South Carolina
Coastal Council, claiming the BMA, as applied to his parcels, vio-
lated the Takings Clause because the BMA deprived his property of
all economic value.146
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Lucas and defined two per se categories in the
takings claim analysis.147  The first category includes instances when
the government physically invades the property.148  The second cat-
egory constitutes circumstances “where regulation denies all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of land.”149  According to
the Court, these regulatory takings claims would not be subject to
Penn Central’s or Agins’ “case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint.”150  Instead, these claims
would be considered per se regulatory takings and the government
would have to compensate the affected landowners.151  Despite its
adoption of this new categorical takings rule, the Court also noted
the government may avoid compensating the affected landowner if
it proves the landowner’s proposed action would already be pre-
cluded under nuisance law.152  The Court reasoned a new law
should not be considered a taking if the landowner’s proposed con-
duct is already unlawful under pre-existing state property and nui-
sance law.153
145. Id. at 1007-09 (detailing impact of Beachfront Management Act on Lu-
cas’ request for permit to build on property he owned on barrier island near
Charleston).
146. Id. at 1009 (describing Lucas’ claim that BMA completely deprived his
property of value and he was entitled to compensation from South Carolina).
147. Id. at 1015 (describing two per se regulatory takings categories).
148. Id. (describing per se physical invasion takings category).
149. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16, 1030-32 (reversing lower court decision favor-
ing South Carolina Coastal Council and describing circumstances that constitute
categorical takings in violation of Takings Clause).  Litigation ended in this case
when the Council purchased Lucas’ lot for $1,575,000.  Aaron N. Gruen, Takings,
Just Compensation, and the Efficient Use of Land, Urban, and Environmental Resources, 33
URB. LAW. 517, 536 (2001) (describing ultimate outcome of underlying litigation
in Lucas).  The Council later sold the land to another private party who was al-
lowed to develop the land. Id.
150. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (explaining two “categories of regulatory action”
where public interest need not be considered in takings analysis).  After Lucas, the
Court overruled Agins in Lingle v. Chevron leaving Penn Central as the only test used
to conduct a fact-specific inquiry in a takings analysis. See supra notes 89-95 and
accompanying text.
151. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16, 1019 (concluding regulations depriving prop-
erty of all economic value are categorical takings mandating compensation).
152. Id. at 1029-32 (discussing nuisance exception to finding of categorical
taking when regulation deprives affected property of all economic value).
153. See id. at 1029-30 (discussing how takings claim is invalid if property use
would be public nuisance).
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In Lucas, the Court noted the “deprivation of all economically
feasible use” rule it created left open the question of how to deter-
mine the portion of land “against which the loss of value is to be
measured.”154  By leaving this question open, the Court made it dif-
ficult for lower courts to determine whether the value of the prop-
erty diminished enough to constitute a taking.155  If only part of the
property was impacted by the regulation, then basing a takings anal-
ysis only on the value of that part would facilitate a finding that
there was a taking.156  If instead the court considered the value of
the entire property, the part of the property that was still valuable
could provide enough compensation to determine there was no
taking.157  The Supreme Court avoided answering the denominator
question because the property in question was “an estate with a rich
tradition of protection at common law” and the lower court had
already determined the entirety of the property’s economic value
had been lost.158  The Supreme Court later resolved this issue in
Murr v. Wisconsin, as discussed in Subsection H of this section.159
G. Knowing Regulations Before Property Purchase: Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island followed Lucas, resulting in another
victory for property rights advocates.160  Prior to Palazzolo owning
the property, the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Council (RICRMC) designated the majority of his property as a
coastal wetland.161  The RICRMC subsequently passed regulations
in 1971 that significantly limited development on coastal wet-
154. Id. at 1016 n.7 (describing denominator issue to be decided in later
case).
155. See Farber, supra note 15, at 118-25 (discussing denominator question cre-
ated by Pennsylvania Coal and other Supreme Court cases that mention problems
created by denominator question).
156. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (explaining example of how denominator
question makes it difficult to assess economic value loss of property when only part
of property is impacted).
157. Id. (discussing denominator question still left open by Lucas).
158. Id. (explaining why Court in Lucas did not address denominator ques-
tion).
159. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct 1933, 1945-46 (2017) (detailing how to de-
termine denominator in takings analysis).
160. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (explaining pas-
sage of regulation before property ownership was not bar to regulatory takings
claim); James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the Environment After Palazzolo, 30
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 27, 64 (2002) (discussing how Palazzolo facilitated plain-
tiff’s ability to show takings claim is ripe).
161. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614 (detailing passage of laws limiting development
on beachfront properties).
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lands.162  Palazzolo later attempted to obtain permits to develop his
property, but the RICRMC denied his application for permits.163
After his application was denied, Palazzolo filed a complaint,
alleging the denial of his application was a regulatory taking that
violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because he had not
been compensated.164  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island eventu-
ally ruled the application denial was not a “taking” because the reg-
ulations that applied to Palazzolo’s property were passed prior to
Palazzolo obtaining the property.165  The court reasoned Palazzolo,
as a new property owner, should have been on notice of the regula-
tion when he obtained the property.166
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court first
concluded that one’s acquisition of title after regulations are
promulgated does not  bar a takings claim.167  The Court noted
that such a bar would result in an “expiration date on the Takings
Clause,” leaving new owners unable to contest land use regula-
tions.168  The Supreme Court then held Palazzolo failed to show the
property had been deprived of all economic use because Palazzolo
was still allowed to build a large residence on the property.169  The
Court then remanded the trial to have the lower court apply the
Penn Central test.170
162. Id. (describing impact of regulations aiming to protect coastal wetlands).
163. Id. at 614-15 (describing Palazzolo’s repeated attempts to obtain building
permit).  RICRMC’s final permit denial under review in Palazzolo was based on a
finding that the petitioner’s application was deficient, given the nature of his pro-
posed project. Id. at 615.  RICRMC determined the project did not “serve ‘a com-
pelling public purpose which provides benefits to the public as a whole as opposed
to individual or private interests.’” Id.
164. Id. at 615-16 (describing Palazzolo’s claims against RICRMC for denial of
permit application).
165. See id. at 616 (discussing Rhode Island Supreme Court decision to rule
against Palazzolo).
166. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616 (explaining Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
rationale that Palazzolo held “‘no reasonable investment-backed expectations that
were affected by [the wetlands] regulation’ because it predated his ownership” of
the property).
167. See id. at 616, 627-29 (reversing Rhode Island Supreme Court’s determi-
nation that enactment of challenged regulations prior to property ownership bars
takings claim).
168. Id. at 627 (discussing Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision would un-
justly deprive future property owners of ability to challenge regulations under Tak-
ings Clause).
169. Id. at 631 (explaining why Palazzolo’s land was still economically valu-
able).
170. Id. at 632 (remanding to lower court because lower court did not origi-
nally apply Penn Central test).
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The decision in Palazzolo represented a significant victory for
property rights owners.171  In particular, Palazzolo created the op-
portunity for more land owners to bring takings claims by allowing
new owners to sue the government for pre-existing regulations.172
Had the Court held the opposite, it is likely the government would
have still been subject to increased takings claims.173  Specifically,
property owners would have had “a compelling incentive to chal-
lenge regulations whenever they [were] passed,” as buyers would
have been less willing to purchase property saddled by regulations
that could not be challenged post-purchase.174
H. Balancing the Checkbook: Murr v. Wisconsin and
Determining the Denominator
After Palazzolo, the Supreme Court did not hear a major case
involving the Takings Clause until over ten years later in Murr v.
Wisconsin.175  In Murr, the Court faced the challenge of defining the
“unit of property against which to assess the effect of [a] challenged
governmental action.”176  The underlying case concerned the im-
pact of Wisconsin rules that prohibited developing or selling adja-
cent lots under common ownership as separate building sites,
unless the lots had at least one acre of land capable of develop-
ment.177  Together, the petitioners, a group of siblings in the Murr
family, owned two adjacent parcels near the Lower St. Croix River
in Troy, Wisconsin.178  The petitioners wanted to develop one lot
and sell the other, but were prohibited from doing so because there
was less than one acre of developable land on the parcel.179  The
petitioners brought suit against the State of Wisconsin and St. Croix
County, claiming Wisconsin’s land use rules constituted a regula-
171. See infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text (discussing how Palazzolo
impacted government and private property owners in regulatory takings cases).
172. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632 (holding Palazzolo’s claim was ripe even
though regulation existed before property purchase).
173. See Burling, supra note 160, at 44 (discussing problems government
would have if private property owners were unable to bring regulatory takings
claim when regulation existed before property purchase).
174. See id. at 44 (explaining potential incentive of private property owner
seller to bring takings claim if purchaser could not).
175. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2017) (discussing regula-
tory takings issue considered by Court concerning regulations that impeded devel-
opment on residential lot).
176. Id. at 1943 (describing question presented to Supreme Court).
177. See id. at 1940 (describing Wisconsin law banning sale of petitioners’
land).
178. Id. at 1940-41 (describing ownership history of properties in question).
179. Id. at 1941 (discussing petitioners’ failed attempts to develop and sell
parts of their property due to Wisconsin land use rules).
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tory taking without compensation because the rules effectively de-
prived petitioners of their ability to use their land.180
The Court’s analysis centered on whether the petitioners’
property should be defined as two separate parcels or one whole
parcel.181  In making this determination, the Court announced that
the relevant property boundary for a regulatory takings analysis de-
pends on “whether reasonable expectations about property owner-
ship would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would
be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts.”182
According to the majority, courts should consider three factors
to evaluate a landowner’s reasonable expectations about property
ownership.183  First, “courts should give substantial weight” to state
and local laws governing land division.184  Second, courts must con-
sider the “physical characteristics of the landowner’s property.”185
Lastly, courts “should assess the value of the property under the
challenged regulation.”186  According to the Court, “special atten-
tion” should be given to the “effect of burdened land on the value
of other holdings.”187
After applying its multifactor denominator test, the Court con-
cluded the petitioners’ two lots should be treated as one parcel.188
When the Court assessed the property as a whole, it found the prop-
180. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941 (describing petitioners’ complaint and request
for damages).  Specifically, the petitioners’ contended Wisconsin’s land use rules
impeded petitioners’ use of their undeveloped lot because it could not be sold or
developed separately from other, more developed lot. Id.
181. See id. at 1945-50 (discussing how to define property boundaries of
Murr’s property).
182. Id. at 1945 (outlining test to determine denominator for regulatory tak-
ings analysis).
183. See id. at 1945-46 (discussing multiple considerations necessary to deter-
mine proper denominator).
184. Id. at 1945 (describing first factor of denominator test).
185. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945-46 (discussing second factor of denominator
test).
186. Id. at 1946 (describing third factor of denominator test).
187. Id. (discussing need for courts to examine challenged regulation’s im-
pact on landowner’s other properties).
188. Id. at 1948 (applying denominator test to disputed property in Murr).
Under the first factor, the Court found state and local law indicated the parcel
should be treated as a whole because the merger provision “was for a specific and
legitimate purpose” and “consistent with the widespread understanding that lot
lines are not dominant or controlling in every case.” Id.  Under the second factor,
the Court concluded the physical traits of the land supported the property’s treat-
ment as one lot because the lots were “contiguous along their longest edge,” had
difficult terrain and a narrow shape that a person could expect to limit the prop-
erty’s use, and were adjacent to a river under regulation by the government. Id.
Under the third factor, the Court determined the lot had significant value when
the two parcels were merged together. Id. at 1948-49.
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erty’s value had only decreased by ten percent under Wisconsin’s
land use rules.189  Consequently, the Court found that no taking
occurred under Lucas because the petitioners’ property was not de-
prived of all economic value.190  Finally, the Court held the peti-
tioners also did not have a valid regulatory takings claim under the
Penn Central test.191  Because the rules at issue existed before the
petitioners owned their property, the petitioners “[could not] claim
that they reasonably expected to sell or develop their lots
separately.”192
Some commentators have viewed Murr as a major setback to
the property rights movement by restricting a private property
owner’s ability to claim there was a total deprivation of value.193
This view finds support in the first factor of the majority’s denomi-
nator test, which requires courts to afford “substantial weight” to
state and local law.194  More specifically, serious concern was raised
that this requirement inserts “public policy considerations into the
definition of private property itself,” which would lead courts to
favor the government over the private property owner.195  Others
may argue this claim is unfounded, as the same test also requires
courts to consider the regulation’s impact on the affected prop-
erty’s value.196  Because Murr was decided recently, it remains to be
seen whether Murr will significantly shift the Supreme Court’s regu-
latory takings jurisprudence in favor of environmental
regulations.197
189. See id. at 1949 (applying takings analysis to regulated property in Murr).
190. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949 (describing impact of concluding land value only
decreased by ten percent).
191. Id. at 1949-50 (applying Penn Central test to assess whether Murr had
valid takings claim).
192. Id. at 1949 (explaining why petitioners could not prevail under Penn Cen-
tral test).
193. See Nicolle Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin,
2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131, 133, 147-49 (2017) (criticizing Court’s decision in
Murr for giving too much deference to government and creating “mudslide” that
could damage private property rights); Farber, supra note 15, at 166-67 (discussing
narrowing of takings claims following Murr).
194. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945 (describing first factor of denominator test and
rationale behind it).
195. Stelle Garnett, supra note 193, at 147-48 (discussing risk that private
property owners may have to “bear public burdens” when property use is
regulated).
196. See id. at 1946 (noting need to consider impact on property’s economic
potential in regulatory takings analysis).
197. See Harvard Law Review Association, Fifth Amendment—Takings Clause—
Regulatory Takings—Murr v. Wisconsin, 131 HARV. L. REV. 253, 260-62 (2017) (dis-
cussing how government and developers could each use third factor of Murr test to
their advantage in future takings cases).
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III. CHANGING METHODS IN BANK CHOICES: TRENDS IN
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Cases decided since Pennsylvania Coal reveal general trends
concerning the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Takings
Clause.198  First, although the Supreme Court has consistently
stated a regulatory takings analysis should be an ad hoc, fact-specific
analysis, the Court has slowly added factors that must be considered
in the analysis.199  Second, the Court’s regulatory takings analysis
has reflected a struggle to balance private property rights and the
public interest.200  Third, this struggle has resulted in an ideological
divide in the Court, where conservative justices have generally fa-
vored private property rights, while liberal justices have typically af-
forded greater weight to the public interest.201
A. Clarifications in the Ad Hoc Analysis
Between Pennsylvania Coal in 1922 and Murr in 2017, the Court
has insisted that takings analyses be “ad hoc, factual inquiries, de-
signed to allow careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances.”202  In 1922, Pennsylvania Coal limited the fact-spe-
cific nature of takings analysis by requiring courts to find a taking
had occurred if a regulation diminished a property’s value to “a
certain magnitude.”203  Unfortunately, Pennsylvania Coal did not
provide any guidance as to what magnitude of devaluation entitles
an affected property owner to compensation.204
After Penn Central, the Supreme Court began to articulate spe-
cial situations that could be considered regulatory takings.205  The
first was identified in Lucas, where the Court concluded if a regula-
tion completely extinguished the economic potential of the af-
198. See infra notes 157-195 and accompanying text (discussing development
of takings analysis in Supreme Court cases).
199. See infra notes 202-213 and accompanying text (detailing ad hoc analysis
of takings claims and slow clarification of takings analysis).
200. See infra notes 214-226 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court’s increasing focus on economic concerns in regulatory takings cases).
201. See infra notes 227-232 and accompanying text (explaining dichotomy
between conservative and liberal justices regarding regulatory takings decisions).
202. See Murr, 137 S. Ct at 1942 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)) (describing why ad hoc, fact-
specific analysis has been applied in Supreme Court regulatory takings cases).
203. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating economics
should be considered).
204. See id. (noting whether property has suffered sufficient loss of value as to
require compensation “depends upon the particular facts.”).
205. See infra notes 206-213 and accompanying text (discussing new category
for takings analysis created in Lucas).
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fected property, a Court would find a per se taking had occurred.206
Lucas also provided the caveat of the nuisance exception, which up-
holds the constitutionality of a government regulation under the
Takings Clause if, under common law, the property owner’s pro-
posed action would be a nuisance.207  Later, in First English, the
Court again constrained the fact-specific nature of the regulatory
takings analysis, holding that even a temporary regulation could be
considered regulatory taking.208
One problem that plagued the regulatory taking analysis was
how to determine the portion of land against which the diminution
in value would be measured.209  Property rights advocates favored
singling out the part of the land impacted by the regulation, which
would increase the likelihood a Court would find the regulation
constituted a taking.210  This interpretation conflicted with Penn
Central, where the Supreme Court stated the parcel should be con-
sidered as a whole.211  The Court finally settled the denominator
question in Murr by creating a three-factor test to determine the
property boundary used in a regulatory takings analysis.212  Notably,
this three-factor test reflects the Court’s longstanding preference
for an ad hoc approach to a regulatory takings claim because the
test’s outcome depends largely upon the facts in each case.213
B. Private Property Owners v. Public Interest
A common theme in regulatory takings cases is the need to
balance the private property owner’s rights with the public inter-
206. See supra notes 144-159 and accompanying text (discussing how Lucas
created a new category).
207. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text (discussing limitation to
per se takings finding identified in Lucas).
208. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. City of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987) (stating disagreement with California Court
of Appeal’s ruling in favor of County of Los Angeles).
209. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (high-
lighting consequences of Court’s failure to determine property boundaries as-
sessed in regulatory taking claims).
210. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing landowners’ argu-
ment for adopting per se rule).
211. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978) (discussing how regulatory takings analysis evaluates impact on “parcel as a
whole.”).
212. See supra notes 175-192 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s crea-
tion of denominator test).
213. See Farber, supra note 15, at 146, 148 (discussing Court’s favoring of ad
hoc approach to regulatory takings analysis).
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est.214  The Court has considered the economic impact on the
property central to determining whether the private property
owner’s interests have been violated.215  Two out of three factors in
the Penn Central analysis focus on the economic consequences of a
taking, including the impact on the private property owner’s invest-
ment-backed expectations.216 Lucas also placed strong emphasis on
economic factors by creating a special category for private landown-
ers who were deprived of all viable economic use of their land.217
The Supreme Court has also underscored the public interest as
an important factor when assessing a regulatory takings claim, al-
though not always consistently.218  In Nollan, the Court noted that
although a continuous strip of land allowing public access to beach
could be in the public interest, this did not preclude the Court
from finding a taking had occurred based on the underlying
facts.219  Later, in Lucas, the Court articulated the nuisance excep-
tion as a way to prevent economic concerns from taking prece-
dence over the public interest.220  As the Court explained, “the
owner of a lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled to compen-
sation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfil-
ling operation that would have the effect of flooding others’
land.”221
The Court has recognized the “central dynamic” of the regula-
tory takings doctrine is the balance between private property rights
and the public interest.222  In Murr, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, emphasized the regulatory takings doctrine’s purpose is
214. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct 1933, 1943 (2017) (articulating property
rights and public interest as two “persisting” interests in regulatory takings analy-
sis); see Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (discussing govern-
ment’s need to balance rights of private property owners with public interest when
regulating land use).
215. See infra notes 216-217 and accompanying text (discussing role of eco-
nomic value of property in Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence).
216. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(stating factors to consider in regulatory takings analysis).
217. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s crea-
tion of new category for regulatory takings analysis).
218. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text (describing Court’s con-
sideration of public interest in regulatory takings analysis).
219. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (holding
public interest in beach access insufficient defense to Nollans’ takings claim).
220. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (discussing
nuisance exception to Lucas category in regulatory takings analysis).
221. Id. at 1029 (demonstrating how property owner cannot prevail on regu-
latory takings claim when owner’s use of land negatively impacts surrounding
community).
222. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (discussing regula-
tory takings doctrine as a reconciliation between “two competing objectives”).
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the protection of property rights by “preserv[ing] freedom”, and
simultaneously, ensuring the government maintains its “well-estab-
lished power to ‘adjus[t] rights for the public good.’”223  In dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts also underscored the need for balance be-
tween private property rights and the public interest.224  Chief Jus-
tice Roberts suggested that without this balance, property owners’
rights would disappear because the government would be able to
restrict property owners’ use of their land without physically invad-
ing it.225  He also expressed concern that property rights would be
overlooked without this balance because a regulation is often cre-
ated in response to a visible public policy issue, while the concept of
protecting property rights is more abstract.226
C. Supreme Court Conservative Justices v. Liberal Justices
When evaluating the Court’s attempt to balance private prop-
erty rights and the public interest, a divide emerges between the
conservative and liberal justices.227  Justice Kennedy and Chief Jus-
tice Roberts espouse the view, which the Supreme Court has largely
adopted over the years, that the regulatory takings doctrine should
operate to protect the freedom that comes with property rights.228
Chief Justice Rehnquist, another historically conservative Supreme
Court justice, has focused on the extent of burdens on landowners
resulting from land use restrictions.229  Conversely, liberal justices,
such as Justice Stevens, have often emphasized the property owner’s
duty to the community.230  Regardless of whether a Supreme Court
justice is conservative or liberal, all have agreed that private prop-
erty rights are subject to the public interest to some degree.231
223. Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)) (describing two
interests that are balanced in regulatory takings analysis).
224. Id. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing how regulatory takings
cases have balanced private property rights with the public interest).
225. Id. (discussing potential threat to protect private property rights).
226. See id. at 1955 (discussing additional concerns about private property
rights).
227. See infra notes 228-232 and accompanying text (discussing differing views
between liberal and conservative Supreme Court justices within regulatory takings
cases).
228. See Farber, supra note 15, at 157-58 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ and
Justice Kennedy’s rationale in support of regulatory takings doctrine that protects
property rights).
229. See Cordes, supra note 96, at 4 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view
of regulatory takings analysis).
230. Id. (discussing Justice Stevens’ view of regulatory taking analysis).
231. Id. at 3 (discussing point of agreement between Supreme Court justices
regarding regulatory takings analysis).
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These differing views suggest that a change in the Supreme Court’s
makeup could have a significant effect on future takings cases.232
IV. PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT’S
BANK: THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Environmental regulations often interfere with the use of pri-
vate property.233  One major impediment to property development
is the regulation of wetlands.234  Wetland regulations often require
a dredge and fill permit or local land use permit, with exactions to
be issued before a property owner can alter a wetland.235  Despite
the potential for dredge and fill permit application denials to in-
trude on private property rights, lower federal courts generally have
concluded such denials do not constitute unlawful takings.236
A. Takings Jurisprudence and Dredge and Fill Permits
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), a dredge
and fill permit is required “for the discharge of dredged or fill ma-
terial into the navigable waters.”237  The CWA gives the Army Corps
of Engineers (Corps) the responsibility of issuing permits.238  Pri-
vate property owners who want to build on their land may need to
fill a wetland to begin construction.239  The requirements of a
dredge and fill permit can limit a property owner’s ability to fill a
wetland by either requiring mitigation of potential destruction to
232. See supra notes 227-231 and accompanying text (discussing different
views between liberal and conservative Supreme Court justices).
233. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 153-54 (1990)
(discussing private landowner trying to fill wetland on property being denied state
and federal dredge and fill permits); see Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the
Takings Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 4-5 (1988) (discussing
issues caused by reconciling environmental regulations with Takings Clause).
234. Simeon D. Rapoport, Comment, The Taking of Wetlands Under Section 404
of the Clean Water Act, 17 ENVTL. L. 111 (1986) (discussing difficulties private prop-
erty owners face when trying to develop wetlands).
235. See infra notes 261-264 and accompanying text (discussing CWA require-
ments for dredge and fill permits and usage of permit exactions to protect
wetlands).
236. See infra notes 243-256 and accompanying text (describing Court of Fed-
eral Claims takings cases involving dredge and fill permits and analyzing their
holdings).
237. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012) (stating requirement to ob-
tain permit before dredging and filling).
238. Id. §§ 1344(a), 1344(d) (giving Secretary of Army authority to issue
dredge and fill permits).
239. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 153-54 (1990)
(discussing private property owner’s need to fill wetland to develop land).
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the wetland or prohibiting building on the wetland.240  When a
property owner is denied a permit to fill land, courts have deter-
mined the property owner can file a Fifth Amendment takings
claim against the Corps.241  Property owners have often brought
Fifth Amendment takings claims for dredge and fill permit denials
since the 1970s, although generally they are not successful.242
To assess the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s regula-
tory takings cases on the CWA, a review was conducted of twenty-
one takings cases challenging dredge and fill permit decisions in
the Court of Federal Claims.243  The analysis included all dredge
and fill takings cases in the Court of Federal Claims from 1980 to
2017 that resulted in a ruling on whether a taking had occurred.244
The Court of Federal Claims was chosen because under the Tucker
240. See id. at 154 (discussing state fill permit requiring mitigation and Corps
denying federal dredge and fill permit request).
241. See id. (discussing landowner filing suit claiming takings occurred with-
out compensation); American Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957, 961-
62 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding plaintiff could not obtain injunction to have dredge
and fill permit approved and instead should file takings claim in Court of Claims,
predecessor of Court of Federal Claims).
242. See infra notes 246-256 and accompanying text (discussing survey of
dredge and fill permit takings cases in United States Court of Federal Claims be-
tween 1980 and 2017); Rapaport, supra note 234, at 117, 122-24 (1986) (discussing
how land developers have brought takings claims when denied dredge and fill per-
mits since 1970s and how takings claims are rarely successful).
243. See infra notes 244-260 and accompanying text (discussing survey of
dredge and fill regulatory takings cases).  The survey of cases included Lost Tree
Village Corp. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 219, 233 (2014); Mehaffy v. United
States, 102 Fed. Cl. 755, 769 (2012); Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 358
(2006); Sartori v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 263, 277 (2005); Norman v. United
States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 234 (2004); Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 58
Fed. Cl. 657, 686 (2003); Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed.
Cl. 462, 478 (2003); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 249 (2001); Florida
Rock Industr., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 23 (1999); Walcek v. United
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 462, 468 (1999); Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed.
Cl. 56, 60 (1997); Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 84 (1997); Marks v. United
States, 34 Fed. Cl. 387, 403, 411 (1995); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 40
(1994); 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 575, 576 (1992); Tabb Lakes,
Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1357 (1992); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl.
Ct. 310, 311 (1991); Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156, 157 (1990); Loveladies
Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 153; Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 476, 477-78
(1981); Jentgen v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 527, 528-29 (1981).
244. See supra note 243 (listing decisions made on whether there was regula-
tory taking when Army Corps denied dredge and fill permits).  Regulatory takings
claims for denial or delay of dredge and fill permits that were dismissed based on
procedural grounds were not included because they did not conduct a full analysis
on whether there was a taking. See Pax Christi Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 52 Fed. Cl. 318, 323-24 (2002) (dismissing regulatory takings claim for delay
in issuing dredge and fill permit on ripeness grounds); Heck v. United States, 37
Fed. Cl. 245, 247 (1997) (dismissing regulatory takings claim for delay in reviewing
dredge and fill permit application as not ripe).
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Act, it has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against United States
based on the U.S. Constitution.245  In the 1980s, there were only
two cases in which plaintiffs alleged the United States conducted a
taking when the Army Corps of Engineers denied those plaintiffs’
dredge and fill permit applications, Deltona Corp. v. United States and
Jentgen v. United States; in both cases, the court ruled no taking had
occurred.246  The court in Deltona held the United States did not
conduct a taking because multiple economic uses for the land re-
mained, despite the permit denials’ significant impact on the land’s
overall value.247  In Jentgen, the court held no taking occurred be-
cause in spite of the permit denial, the property’s approximate mar-
ket value was consistent with the original purchase price and twenty
acres of the property could still be developed.248
A sharp increase in dredge and fill takings cases occurred in
the 1990s, where, in eight cases, the court determined there was no
taking and, in three cases, there was a taking.249  There was an over-
all decline in takings cases in the 2000s, resulting in only six Court
of Federal Claims decisions.250  In all six cases, the court found
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012) (granting United States Court of Federal
Claims jurisdiction to hear cases against United States for claims based on Consti-
tution, federal statute, or federal regulation).  The Tucker Act is “a jurisdictional
statute” that “does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United
States for money damages.”  United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
246. Deltona Corp., 228 Ct. Cl. at 477-78 (holding denial of dredge and fill
permit was not taking); Jentgen, 228 Ct. Cl. at 528-29 (determining taking had not
occurred).
247. Deltona Corp., 228 Ct. Cl. at 482-84, 491-93 (discussing background of
case and takings analysis of plaintiff’s claim, and holding denial of “highest and
best economic use” of plaintiff’s property did not cause a taking).
248. Jentgen, 228 Ct. Cl. at 533-34 (discussing takings analysis of plaintiff’s
claim and holding property value had not diminished enough to find taking had
occurred).
249. Florida Rock Industries, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23 (finding Corps effected a regula-
tory taking); Walcek, 44 Fed. Cl. at 468 (holding no temporary taking occurred);
Forest Properties, 39 Fed. Cl. at 60 (finding no regulatory taking); Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at
84 (concluding no taking occurred); Marks, 34 Fed. Cl. at 411 (holding plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate regulatory taking occurred); Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 40 (hold-
ing taking of plaintiff’s property occurred); 1902 Atlantic Ltd., 26 Cl. Ct. at 576
(holding no taking occurred); Tabb Lakes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1357 (finding defendant
was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s takings claim); Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct.
at 311 (holding plaintiffs could not prevail on takings claim); Dufau, 22 Cl. Ct. at
157 (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s takings
claim); Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 153 (holding taking of plaintiff’s property
occurred).
250. Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 358 (holding no taking occurred); Sartori, 67 Fed. Cl.
at 277 (finding no temporary categorical taking); Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 234 (con-
cluding no taking occurred); Palm Beach Isles Assoc., 58 Fed. Cl. at 686 (holding
Corps did not engage in regulatory taking); Bay-Houston Towing Company, 58 Fed.
Cl. at 478 (granting defendant’s summary judgment motion for plaintiff’s tempo-
rary takings claim); Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 249 (holding no taking occurred).
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there was no taking.251  There was a further decline in takings cases
from 2010 to 2017, resulting in only two takings cases.252  In the
first case, the court held there was no taking, and in the second
case, the court concluded there was a taking.253
Between 1980 and 2017, there was no observable shift in the
Court of Federal Claims’ willingness to conclude takings had oc-
curred in cases involving dredge and fill takings claims.254  After the
1987 Supreme Court cases and Lucas, the court was still more likely
to determine there was no taking in dredge and fill permit cases.255
This finding suggests the Supreme Court cases did not have a large
impact on the Court of Federal Claims’ rulings in takings cases for
dredge and fill permits.256
Significantly, there was a larger number of Court of Federal
Claims dredge and fill permit takings cases in the 1990s and early
2000s.257  It is possible the Supreme Court’s decision First English
contributed to the rise in these claims because it gave plaintiffs the
opportunity to bring takings claims for temporary regulations.258
In the 1980s before First English, the survey shows the Court of Fed-
eral Claims never ruled on a temporary takings claim.259  After First
English, seven cases in the 1990s and 2000s involved temporary tak-
ings claims, which constituted more than half of the total takings
cases.260
251. See supra note 250 (listing six decisions where court concluded there was
no taking).
252. See Lost Tree, 115 Fed. Cl. at 233 (determining dredge and fill permit
caused taking); Mehaffy, 102 Fed. Cl. at 769 (holding denial of dredge and fill
permit was not regulatory taking).
253. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (discussing outcomes of cases
between 2010 and 2017).
254. See supra notes 246-253 and accompanying text (listing findings in tak-
ings cases for dredge and fill permits between 1980 and 2017).
255. See supra notes 246-253 and accompanying text (listing findings in tak-
ings cases for dredge and fill permits between 1987 and 2017).
256. See supra note 255 and accompanying text (describing court holdings af-
ter 1987).
257. See supra notes 249-251 and accompanying text (showing court holdings
in dredge and fill permit takings cases from 1990 to 2017).
258. See infra notes 259-260 and accompanying text (discussing survey find-
ings showing increase in temporary takings claims after First English).
259. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing 1980s regulatory
taking cases holdings).
260. See supra notes 249-253 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory
taking cases holdings from 1990-2017); Sartori v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 263,
277 (2005) (no temporary regulatory taking); Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl.
231, 234 (2004) (no temporary regulatory taking); Walcek v. United States, 44 Fed.
Cl. 462, 468 (1999) (no temporary regulatory taking); Marks v. United States, 34
Fed. Cl. 387, 403, 411 (1995) (no temporary regulatory taking); Tabb Lakes, Inc. v.
United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1357 (1992) (no temporary regulatory taking); 1902
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B. Takings Clause and Local Land Use Permits
The Supreme Court’s takings cases may also indirectly limit the
ability of local land regulations to protect wetlands.261  Local land
use permits often have exactions, which require the builder to set
aside part of the property to be used in the public interest or pay a
fee to the local government.262  A study, which observed the im-
pacts of the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence on local land
use decisions in California, found the Supreme Court cases may
have made it more difficult for heavily developed communities with
infrastructure issues to place exactions on developers.263  This prob-
lem could lead to communities using impact fees over exactions,
which would lead to “less wetlands and habitat protection.”264
V. CONCLUSION
From Pennsylvania Coal in 1922 to cases like Palazzolo today, the
Supreme Court has slowly strengthened property rights in regula-
tory taking cases at the expense of the public interest.265  The clear-
est example of this occurred in Lucas, where the Court determined
a regulation that completely diminished a property’s economic
value would constitute a categorical taking.266  As the Court in Lu-
cas explained, the legitimacy of land-use regulations to promote the
public interest cannot be applied “to the relatively rare situations
where the government has deprived a landowner of all economi-
cally beneficial uses.”267  Despite the Supreme Court’s shift in favor
of property rights, the Court’s jurisprudence has not caused a ma-
Atlantic Ltd. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 575, 576 (1992) (no temporary regulatory
taking); Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156, 157 (1990) (no temporary regula-
tory taking).
261. See infra notes 262-264 and accompanying text (discussing concerns
about Supreme Court takings jurisprudence on local land use decisions and
wetlands).
262. MICHAEL A. ZIZKA ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE LIA-
BILITY § 18:2, Westlaw (database updated December 2018) (explaining concepts of
exactions and impact fees and how courts determine whether they are legal).
263. See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Su-
preme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 103, 156 (2001) (discussing Supreme Court takings jurisprudence impact on
heavily developed communities).
264. See id. (discussing problems with using impact fees over exactions).
265. See supra notes 38-174 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence favoring property rights advocates).
266. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (identifying
second circumstance entitling affected property owner to compensation “without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the
restraint.”).
267. Id. at 1018 (describing rationale for categorical takings rule).
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jor impact on lower federal court rulings on regulatory takings
claims.268  This may be due to the ad hoc nature of the takings anal-
ysis, which still allows courts significant flexibility when deciding a
takings case.269
The Supreme Court’s takings cases may cause governments to
avoid takings claims by passing fewer environmental regulations or
issuing permits with fewer restrictions on land use.270  This could
greatly impact some areas of environmental law, particularly the
CWA’s dredge and fill permitting system.271  Studies should be con-
ducted to see if the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings decisions
have impacted permitting systems, like dredge and fill permits, and
if impacted, to determine if there has been a decrease in mitigation
measures required by the permits.272  In the future, courts should
be cautious and ensure that private property rights are not pro-
tected to the point of imposing unnecessary harm on the
environment.273
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence could shift to
some degree with a change of justices on the Court.274  With
younger, conservative Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh replacing
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, respectively, on the Court, the con-
servative majority that favors private property rights will likely con-
tinue for the foreseeable future.275  A conservative majority may not
268. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text (discussing Court of Fed-
eral Claims decisions in regulatory taking cases pertaining to dredge and fill
permits).
269. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing trends in United
States Court of Federal Claims cases between 1980 and 2017).
270. See supra notes 261-264 and accompanying text (discussing concerns
about Supreme Court takings jurisprudence on local land use decisions and
wetlands).
271. See supra notes 239-241 and accompanying text (discussing potential im-
pacts of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence on dredge and fill permits).
272. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 263, at 156 (showing impact on local
land use decisions that suggest wetlands protection through permits may by
weakened).
273. See supra notes 270-271 and accompanying text (discussing potential
problems between Supreme Court takings jurisprudence and dredge and fill
permits).
274. See infra notes 275-276 and accompanying text (discussing how changes
in Supreme Court justices could impact regulatory takings doctrine).
275. See Richard Wolf, Justice Gorsuch Confirms Conservatives’ Hopes, Liberals’
Fears in First Year on Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2018, 9:45 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/04/08/justice-gorsuch-confirms-
conservatives-hopes-liberals-fears-first-year-supreme-court/486630002/ (discussing
various cases where Justice Gorsuch ruled on conservative side); see Sheryl Gay Stol-
berg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, NY TIMES (Oct. 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-sup
reme-court.html (reporting Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation to Supreme
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dramatically favor private property rights, as conservative justices
have historically valued the regulatory takings doctrine’s ad hoc,
fact-specific approach.276
Over the years, there has been a constant fight between envi-
ronmentalists and private property rights advocates.277  Although
private property rights movement has found success in recent years,
there is a recognized need to find a middle ground between pro-
tecting valuable environmental regulations and important land and
business developments.278  While land and business development is
necessary to promote a strong economy, it can come at the expense
of maintaining a healthy environment.279  A lack of federal environ-
mental regulations could impose major costs on communities for
necessary remedies, such as upgrades to water treatment facilities to
prevent contamination or raising roads in coastal cities to combat
rising sea levels.280
According to scholars James E. Holloway and D. Tevis Noelt-
ing, one way to deal with these challenges is to create “integrated
sustainability regulation[s].”281  These regulations would combine
existing and new environmental regulations, while considering the
needs of land and business developers.282  By taking into considera-
tion land and business developers’ needs when creating environ-
mental regulations, extensive litigation over takings claims could be
Court and discussing how his confirmation will solidify conservative majority on
Court).
276. See Farber, supra note 15, at 166-67 (discussing potential future of takings
doctrine).
277. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (explaining disagreements
between environmentalists and private property rights advocates).
278. See James E. Holloway & D. Tevis Noelting, Takings Clause and Integrated
Sustainability Policy and Regulation: The Proportionality of the Burdens of Exercising Prop-
erty Rights and Paying Just Compensation, 29 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2018) (discussing
need to reconcile landowner rights with environmental interests).
279. See id. (describing codependent nature of development and environmen-
tal policy concerns).
280. See Annie Sneed, Trump’s Order May Foul Drinking Water Supply, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-rs
quo-s-order-may-foul-u-s-drinking-water-supply/ (discussing how revoking Clean
Water Rule could require expensive upgrade to water treatment plants); Joey
Flechas, Miami Beach to Begin New $100 Million Flood Prevention Project in Face of Sea
Level Rise, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 23, 2017, 6:03 PM), https://www.miamiherald
.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-beach/article129284119.html
(describing Miami Beach’s new project to raise roads).
281. See Holloway & Noelting, supra note 278, at 3 (discussing need to create
“integrated national regulatory approach for sustainable development and envi-
ronment for current and future generations.”).
282. See id. at 3-4 (discussing how to create integrated sustainability
regulations).
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avoided, so long as these regulations are reasonable.283  To avoid
detrimental delays in development, policymakers should find an ef-
ficient way to create integrated sustainability regulations.284  This
may require state and local level legislators to take the lead, as
policymakers at all levels of government have been slow to pass any
environmental laws.285  The best way to pass integrated sus-
tainability laws is for private property rights advocates and environ-
mentalists to bring their expertise together and provide necessary
pressure on lawmakers.286
Kathleen L. McCanless*
283. See id. at 49 (discussing how regulations need to remember strength of
per se takings rule from Lucas).
284. See id. at 3-11 (discussing how consideration of takings in creation of
regulations could slow process of passing regulations).
285. See id. at 4-5 (discussing how current scheme of environmental regula-
tion is insufficient address “interrelated economic, environmental and social harm
caused by land development, energy production, climate change, and other
activities.”).
286. See supra notes 279-285 and accompanying text (explaining need for en-
vironmentalists to work with private property rights advocates).
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